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Who Spilled Coke On My Laptop?
By
D. French Slaughter
Deloitte & Touche
Washington, D.C.
Fslaughter@dttus.com
5. The Coca Cola loss puts the "WHO", "WHAT" and "Where" of a
"Manufacturer's Business Equipment" in play again.
a. Local Tax Authorities May Vivisect Manufacturing Businesses Between
"Direct" and "Indirect" The Virginia Supreme Court's March 3, 2000 decision
in Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Roanoke, Inc. v. County of Botetour, Record
No. 990409, holds that Coke vending equipment used by Coke bottler to sell the
product it manufactures is not classified as "intangible personal property" and
therefore subject to local tax property because Coke's vending equipment is not
part of Coke's overall manufacturing business.
b. Coke Facts. Coca-Cola sought refunds of local property tax paid by it on its
vending equipment based on the American Woodmark precedent because (a)
making Coca-Cola is manufacturing and (b) Coca-Cola uses its vending
equipment to sell the soft drinks it manufactures. ipsofacto, the vending
equipment was "used in a manufacturing business" and thus taxable only by the
state as intangible personal property. One circuit court and four other localities
had agreed with Coca-Cola and issued refunds. After a full trial in Botetourt
County, the trial court there denied the refund.
c. Both Retail and Wholesale Equipment Involved The vending equipment at
issue included both coin-operated vending machines used by Coke to make its
own retail sales but also open door coolers which Coke kept stocked with its
product that Coke sold at wholesale to storeowners where the Coke coolers are
located. Thus because wholesale sales equipment of a manufacturing business
was involved this case may be used by localities to tax the sales equipment of
manufacturer's who make only wholesale sales. Plus, numerous manufacturers
are now selling at retail on the web, e.g., Gateway and Dell.
d Justice Whiting (Retired) Holds That Selling What You Make is Not Part of
Your Business. Justice Whiting reasoned that Coke was engaged in two
businesses for tax purposes: (1) "manufacturing" and (2) a "separate sales
business". His sole support for this vivisection of Coke's obviously integrated
business was the BPOL case of Caffee v. Norfolk where a retail bakery was not
allowed to escape BPOL gross receipts tax as a retail merchant. However,
Caffee involved only retail sales.
e. The Test Now: Equipment Must Be "Part of" The Manufacturing Function;
"Indirectly" Used Equipment is Taxable The Court reasoned:
Unlike the computers and office equipment in the American Woodmark
and Tultex cases, which were used, in whole or in part, in planning,
directing or administering the manufacturing function, the evidence in
this case indicates that the sales equipment in question was not used in
manufacturing business but merely in selling the finished product. Thus,
we conclude that the evidence supports the court's holding that this
equipment could be considered as sales equipment used in a separate
sales business.
f Brown Boveri and the "Substantiality" Test Rejected The Court also rejected
any reliance on the "substantiality" test of Brown Boveri, in essence saying that
BBC limited to its facts.
g. Does The Court Intend to Denominate Wholesale Sales As A Business
Separate and Apart from the Manufacturing Business. Whiting's opinion is
unclear whether any personal property of a manufacturing business used to make
wholesales sales (e.g. the North American sales office of a server manufacturer)
is taxable as part of a "separate sales business." Despite detailed evidence in
both the Coke record on appeal and explicit discussion of same before the Court
at oral argument, Whiting treated that evidence as non-existent. However, his
opinion does at least imply that "a separate wholesale business" may be taxed
differently than a retail sales business of a manufacturer. Whiting states:
We need not decide whether the taxpayer was also engaged in a separate
wholesale business because the taxpayer has not borne his burden under
Code § 58.1-3984 of showing, which, if any, of the taxed property was
used in sales at the wholesale level.
The Court's comment about failure to carry "the burden" of showing evidence of
wholesale use is astonishing. The evidence of wholesale use by individual
machine was in the record! The Court just ignored it to reach the desired result.
h. Virginia General Assembly and Attorney General Ignored Confusingly, the
Court did not even mention the Virginia legislature's codification after American
Woodmark where it stated that the State's tax base over "intangible personal
property" included but was "not limited to" corporate headquarters equipment.
The AG's ruling holding a pleasure yacht used by a manufacturing business
presumably to entertain business customers was ignored as well. The Court even
ignored its own holding in American Woodmark that the scope of intangible
personal property is to be read broadly and construed strictly against localities.
L Local Reaction. Many Virginia localities may now be emboldened by the Coke
decision and assert property tax on the business equipment of manufacturers
located outside their headquarters, e.g. the sales offices, call centers, web support
center, customer technical support, and even regional headquarters of
manufacturers including computer hardware fabricators are now at risk. While
the facts in Coke involved decidedly low-tech vending equipment, the casual
reasoning of the Supreme Court's ruling opens the door to attack high tech
manufacturers , even those who do no retail sales.
j. Is the Spectre of "No Car Tax" Visible in the Coke Decision?
(i) Court perceives itself as perhaps last defense of local tax base,
i.e., painting itself out of corner. Brown Boveri and American Woodmark were
the paint.
(ii) Unlike the governor Gilmore and the Virginia legislature, the Virginia
Supreme Court may be technology deaf.
II. Other Recent Developments
A. Failed Legislation: HB 1175 (Burden of proof when fighting local real property
tax assessment)
B. Virginia Department of Taxation (VDOT) Able to Hear Personal Property Tax
Appeals
1. See VDOT Guidelines
C. Nagging Issues
1. Does I.R.C. 338(h)(10) election affect property tax assessments?
2. Sales tax in M&A Asset Sales: VDOT Hates Steuart Petroleum
D. Recent Case Law (Other Than Coke)
1. Columbia HCA v. Fairfax County
